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RESUMEN:  
This paper examines the evolution of regional innovation policy in Emilia-
Romagna, and Valencia, regions with similar economic features that implemented 
similar innovation policies in the 1970s and 1980s. We investigate whether their 
similarities have led to similar targets, policy tools and governance developments. We 
show that innovation policy in both regions suffered from the effects of privatization, 
budget constraints and changes to manufacturing during the 1990s and highlight the 
consequences. Although Emilia-Romagna experienced deeper change to its innovation 
policy, privatizations and/or the replacement of public funds promoted commercial 
approaches and induced market failures in both regions. The worst effects of these 
policies were the implementation of less risky innovation projects, the shift towards 
extra-regional projects and markets, and the favouring of large firms.  
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: innovation policy; industrial district; Emilia-Romagna; 
Valencia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
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This paper examines the evolution of regional innovation policy in Emilia-
Romagna, and Valencia, which have similar economic features and which implemented 
similar industry policies in the 1970s and 1980s. These policies were related to 
innovation and linked to the respective territories. The originality and positive 
consequences of these region’s industry policies has attracted research interest focusing 
especially on the role of the regional agencies ERVET (Emilia-Romagna) and IMPIVA 
(Valencia) as flagship organizations. In 1982, the 'Emilian model' (Brusco, 1982), was 
well known in research on design (Brusco, 1992) and implementation of industry policy 
aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) (Brusco, 1989; Bellini, Giordani & 
Pasquini, 1990; Bianchi & Giordani, 1993; Bellini, Mohammad-Saïd &Négrier, 1996; 
Petrakos, 1996; Cowell, 2010; López-Estornell, Mas-Verdú & Molina-Morales, 2008), 
trade union participation in regional economic development (Sleigh, 1993) and 
evolution of the policy model (Cooke, 1996; Bellini & Pasquini 1998; Bianchi, 1998; 
Amin, 1999; Rinaldi, 2005; Bianchi & Sandrine, 2011). Several scholars have written 
about ERVET and other examples of regional development agencies in Italy, for 
example, Bianchi (1992), Bianchi & Pasquini (1998), Belussi (1999), Pietrobelli & 
Rabelloti (2002), Solari (2004) and Maccani & Samoggia (2010), as well as on real 
service centres (RSC), for example, Brusco (1992) and Bellini (1996).  
IMPIVA has been investigated by Ors (1994), Salom-Carrasco (1997), Ponce 
(2004) and Muñoz (2009) while its network of Technology Institutes (TI)2 has attracted 
the interest of other scholars (Esteve, Martínez-Serrano & Picazo, 2000; Albors-
Garrigós, Segarra & Rincó-Díaz , 2010; García-Reche, 2003). The influence of AIJU, 
the Valencia’s TI related to toy firms is examined in Holmström (2006), the services 
provided by INESCOP to the shoe industry is investigated in Tomás, Contreras & Del 
Saz (2000), the contribution to environmental services in tile industry by the IT of 
ceramics (ITC) is explained by García-Reche & Picazo-Tadeo (2007) and the role 
played in textiles of Emilia-Romagna by CITER, a RSC  linked to ERVET, is analysed 
in Bianchi (1995), Bianchi & Bellini (1991, 1995) and Ligabue (1995), while García-
Quevedo & Mas-Verdú (2008) identify some economic variables that explain the use of 
the services provided by TI. Some authors study the relationship between use of TI and 
export activity (Mas-Verdú, Baviera-Puiga & Martínez-Gómez, 2008), the efficacy of 
                                                 
2 Technology Institutes in Valencia and real service centres in Emilia-Romagna offer advanced services 
mainly to SME. 
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knowledge-intensive services (Martínez-Gómez, Baviera-Puiga & Mas-Verdú, 2010) 
and the effect of the IMPIVA programmes on product quality (Moreno, 1993).  
In addition to work that focuses on either Emilia-Romagna or Valencia, there are 
some comparative studies. Emilia-Romagna is contrasted with Baden-Württemberg 
(Heindereich, 1996; Cooke & Morgan, 1994), and Denmark (Kristensen, 1992). 
IMPIVA has been compared with institutions in other regions and countries: see Barge-
Gil & Modrego (2007) for a study of TI in several regions of Spain, Holmstrom (1999) 
for India, Montero (2001) for Brazil, and Samoilovich et al. (2005) for France and 
Holland, among others. Some studies compare the cases of Emilia-Romagna and 
Valencia based on their similar economic, demographic and policy features. For 
example, López-Estornell (2007) develops an extensive face-to-face between both 
regions and Ansell (2000) highlights the existence of networking. Mas-Verdú (2007) 
includes the two regions in a comparison that includes other European regions, and 
Fernández de Lucio, Rojo & Castro (2003) analyses the characteristics of the two areas 
within a broader context.  
This article provides a comparative analysis of one aspect common to these two 
cases which has not previously been investigated: the evolution over time of their 
regional innovation policies and whether the regions’ socioeconomics similarities have 
led to similar policy tool and governance trajectories. 
We look at the implementation of advanced technological services through the 
introduction of RSC in Emilia-Romagna and IT in Valencia, and their effect on SME. 
We discuss the consequences for policy and firms of the privatizations that occurred in 
the regions analysed during the 1990s. Comparison of these two cases highlights the 
conditions needed for persistence (Hughes, 1936) in the institutional arrangements 
related to new policy, which require adaptation to changing environments and sufficient 
stability to ensure transformation (Steinberg, 2012). Comparison of the cases of 
Valencia and Emilia-Romagna will identify some of the factors related to the dynamic 
development of innovation service policies.     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research methodology. 
Section 3 discusses similarities and differences between Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. 
Section 4 examines innovation policies related to advanced technological services for 
SME in the two regions. Section 5 summarizes the changes to innovation policy 
strategies and the effects of the pressures related to the privatization of service provision 
in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna. Section 6 offers some conclusions.  
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2. Research methodology 
 
We chose a qualitative methodology. Information and data were collected using 
explorative methods. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 individuals 
who were in positions of responsibility in regional governments and research 
institutions or were representatives of important firm support organizations (see Annex 
for list of interviewees). All interviews were conducted by a member of the research 
team. Interviewees were sent letters explaining the reasons for the research and topics 
that would be addressed in the interview. Interviewees were also able to expand on 
areas of the regional innovation policies.  
We also administered a survey, that included questions related to innovation and 
cluster policy, which was addressed to 40 academics and experts on regional policy and 
local development, who had participated in the Annual Meeting held in Artimino, (24-
26 September 2008) organized by the Research Institute Iris of Prato with the 
collaboration of University of Firenze. We achieved 15 completed surveys (almost 40% 
response rate).   
Secondary information and data were collected during the fieldwork period, 
from reports, documents, journals and the publications of private and public several 
institutions related to regional development and innovation policy in Valencia and 
Emilia-Romagna. Information was also collected from the publications of relevant 
support firm organizations in both regions. The region of Emilia Romagna has been 
studied in detail in the industrial district literature; the Valencian case has received less 
research attention and, therefore, is described in more detail here.   
 
3. Emilia-Romagna and Valencia: Main similarities and differences  
In the 20th century Emilia-Romagna and Valencia experienced some profound 
changes, including the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy. In the first 
phases of the industrialization of these (and many other) regions, handicrafts were 
important. Both the regions analysed in this paper are specialized in traditional sectors 
including textiles and clothing, ceramics, furniture, footwear, and food products, 
although Emilia-Romagna also manufactures a wide array of machinery. In both regions 
innovation is mainly based on low level presence of in-house R&D and intensive use of 
embodied technology. 
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 Some general features of the two regions 
Emilia-Romagna and Valencia are similar sized geographically, and have 
comparable population numbers (Table 1). Their respective economic nodes are along 
the Via Emilia and the Mediterranean Highway. Both regions are densely populated 
with their urban populations concentrated in the cities of Valencia (population 800,000) 
and Bologna (380,000). Per capita income is above the European average in Emilia 
Romagna, and slightly below it in Valencia.  
 
 
Table 1 Statistics for Emilia-Romagna and Valencia 
  Emilia-Romagna Valencia 
Regional capital Bologna Valencia 
Surface (km2) 22,125 23,254 
Population (2005, ER; 2006, V) 4,187,557 4,806,908 
Regional population as % of national population  7.1 10.8 
Population density (no. of inhabitants/km2) 191 207 
Number of  municipalities 341 542 
Population: main regional city  380,000 934,000 
Population: main regional city + metropolitan area 934,000 1,500,000 
Population of other main cities (*) 98,400-170,000 172,000-322,000 
Number of provinces 9 3 
Main regional transport axis Via Emilia Mediterranean Highway 
Coastline (km approx.) 100 500 
Per capita GDP (European Union=100) in PPP, 2004 130 94 
(*)172,000- 541,000 if the urban area Alicante-Elche is considered 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
Economic similarities  
Valencia and Emilia Romagna have some similar economic features. For 
example, diversification of regional production, which has contributed to the 
achievement of balanced economies; highly export oriented manufacturing and agri-
food industries; prevalence of SME – with especially intense development in the 1960s 
and 1970s; scarcity of state-owned enterprises; social recognition of entrepreneurial 
ventures; high density of firms (8.4 and 7 per 100 inhabitants in 2005 respectively); 
industry specialization above the national average; and predominantly traditional 
manufacturing sectors.  
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In 2003, manufacturing and services accounted for 367,112 firms in Emilia-
Romagna and 299,452 firms in Valencia (which is 82% of the Emilia Romagna total).3 
There are 2,603 firms in Emilia-Romagna and 2,565 firms in Valencia with more than 
50 employees; the numbers of firms employing 10 to 49 workers is similar in the two 
regions as well.  
In both areas, manufacturing is organized mostly in clusters/industrial districts. 
Valencia has the highest number of manufacturing clusters in Spain (almost 50) (Boix 
& Galletto, 2006a, 2006b), although many are very small in size. Its main areas of 
specialization are ceramic tiles (Castelló, Vila-real, Onda), furniture (Vinaròs, 
València), textiles and clothing (Alcoi, Ontinyent), and leather and footwear (Elx, Elda, 
Villena). Emilia-Romagna hosts several industrial districts or local production systems 
(LPS). Its industrial district specialization is very similar to cluster specialization in 
Valencia and includes ceramics (Sassuolo), textiles and clothing (Carpi) and footwear 
(S. Mauro Pascoli, Fusignano). However, Emilia-Romagna is also a specialist producer 
of motorcycles (Bologna) and food processing (Parma) (ERVET, 2002). Finally, both 
regions host important trade fairs (Valencia and Bologna), which are important for 
SME’s export activities.  
 
Economic and political differences  
The major difference between the two regions is that Italy has been a democracy 
since the end of World War II, but Spain’s democratic Constitution did not come to 
power until 1978. Also, Spain became a member of the European Common Market only 
in 1986, an important but belated development for Valencia, whose regional economy 
relies heavily on exporting. Spanish industrialization under Franco’s regime was aligned 
to the establishment and support of large firms to achieve autarchy. National policy 
involved economic interventionism and trade protectionism both of which were 
damaging to export-oriented SME.  
 
Both regions have high concentrations of manufacturing SME, but some of their 
sectoral features differ. Emilia-Romagna has traditional manufacturing sectors, many of 
which are located along the Via Emilia, and a specialized, diffused machinery sector, 
                                                 
3 Italian and Spanish statistics are calculated slightly differently, therefore, these figures should be 
interpreted with some caution. 
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which drives innovation in the region.4 In Valencia, specialization is mainly in 
traditional manufacturing, although since the 1970s, plastics, metals, chemicals and 
packaging sectors have become established. However, in contrast to the situation in 
Emilia-Romagna, there are no ‘push’ sectors similar to machinery, to impel innovation. 
On the other hand, the Italian region holds a greater concentration of manufacturing and 
knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), and a smaller presence of 
construction/building and tourism sectors. 
Valencia and Emilia-Romagna are both exporters: ratio of exports to regional 
added value was 31.4% for Emilia-Romagna in 2004 and 23.5% for Valencia in 2006. 
The comparative weakness of the Spanish region can be set against the effort invested in 
Emilia-Romagna to consolidate international distribution networks and to decentralize 
some phases of production.  
The dominant political party governing Emilia Romagna up to the 1990s was the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI).5 It was anti-large firms (Brusco & Pezzini, 1992), 
which it saw as a legacy of the fascist oligopolies. It was keen to forge strategic 
alliances with SME and to consider the big traditional companies as the common 
enemy. The PCI supported a competitive market as a means to stimulate SME growth 
and to reduce the market power of the large companies. This resulted in support for an 
industrial relations framework that favoured SME, and the implementation of policies 
designed to mitigate the financial and technological advantages of large firms.  
In Valencia, political leadership between 1983 and 1995 was with the Socialist 
Party (PSOE-PSPV), with regional governments predisposed to agreements with unions 
and employers and generally to creating a climate of collaboration to overcome the 
difficult economic situation provoked by the oil crisis and political transition. 
The powers of the two regional governments are different. The process of 
regionalization occurred first in Italy, but the level of responsibility and financial 
resources transferred by the Spanish government to the regions was higher in Spain. 
Regional public funding combined with EU and national funds enabled the development 
of strong industrial policy in Valencia. There is another difference that explains why the 
role of regional government is weaker in Emilia-Romagna, which is the strength of its 
                                                 
4 Emilia-Romagna also hosts automobile, motorcycle and biomedical firms. 
5 Since the early 1990s regional government has been dominated by centre-left coalitions. 
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local and provincial governments compared to those in the region of Valencia, where 
the regional government has experienced more support. Valencia has a smaller 
experience of infra-regional government intervention in local economic development. 
Thus, industrial policy in Valencia had fewer reference points pre the process of 
devolution described in the Spanish Constitution and the Valencia Statute of Autonomy. 
By contrast, the lower budget of regional government in Emilia-Romagna 
stimulated the greater regional coordination of industrial policy with other policies such 
as formal education and, especially, vocational training. The tradition of the-job-training 
in firms contributed to this target, although it was also influenced by the need for more 
skilled workers in the machinery sector and in sectors of the economy that depended on 
their leadership in quality, design and brand. 
Both regions also have different relationships with their respective central 
governments. In the case of Valencia, since 1983, it was only in 1995 and the period 
2004 to 2011 that the parties in power were different, whereas in the case of Emilia-
Romagna, from the introduction of its industrial policy in 1974, the politics of the 
national and regional governments have rarely coincided. 
At the institutional level, the Italian and Spanish employers' associations also 
show some differences: pluralism and competition in the former case and practical 
monopoly of representation of employers in the latter. As a result of competition, the 
degree of association and the force exerted by business associations in providing 
services to their members are also different and more intense in Emilia-Romagna. 
 
4. Innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia: implementation in the 
1970s and 1980s 
  Innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia can be described as 
pioneering in the regional context of the southern European countries (see references 
Section 1). Innovation policy started in Emilia-Romagna in the second half of the 1970s 
and in Valencia in 1983. In the first phase (1975-1990), innovation policy in Emilia-
Romagna prioritized SME and the establishment of RSC as government’s response to 
failures to provide specialized and innovative business services (Brusco &  Pezzini, 
2008). The measures implemented represented political aims to support the position of 
the PCI, to develop alternative policies from those promoted by central government, 
which was controlled by the Christian Democrat Party, and to strengthen the weak 
regional institutions in a territory governed by powerful local authorities. In Valencia, 
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the regional branch of the Socialist Party (PSPV-PSOE) was in power in 1983 to 1995. 
Its agenda included encouraging competition among manufacturing SME, which were 
experiencing productivity problems and high rates of unemployment. Regional policy 
included diversification of the economy and the maintenance of good relationships with 
the few big companies located in the region. The policy emphasis was on the so-called 
real or productive economy as opposed to speculative firms.  
Industry policies in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna in the 1970s and 1980s 
implemented a wide range of tools, although in this paper we focus on a subset related 
to innovation. These policies gave support to individual firms outside of traditional 
industry policy which used to include award of grants, special rates for 
loans/investments and subsidies to reduce the cost of dismissing workers and focused 
sectoral policies. Instead, in the regions studied in this paper, the aim was to establish a 
new economic culture focused on firm innovation. 
The Emilia-Romagna government agency, ERVET,6 was set up in 1974 to 
manage the ERVET-system, which comprised six sectoral service centres and three 
horizontal centres. It also promoted or participated in a financial support organization 
and several local development agencies (see Table 2). ERVET had a majority stake in 
the RSC, which it coordinated and supported financially, with the remaining shares 
belonging to business associations, municipalities and chambers of commerce.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Emilia Romagna Valorizzazione Economica del Territorio (Economic Upgradings of Emilia Romagna’s 
Territory). 
 
Table 2 ERVET  and  IMPIVA systems 
Centre Sector/activity 
Setting 
up year 
% ERVET 
participation (1995) 
Employees 
(1) 
Employees c. 
2005 
Currently part of 
ERVET network Centre Sector/activity 
Setting 
up year 
Employees c. 
1991 
Employees c. 
2006 
Currently part of 
IMPIVA 
network 
Sectoral Services Centres or IT 
CITER Textile 1980 25 19* 12 X INESCOP (1) Footwear 1984 76 118 X 
CESMA Agrarian Machinery 1983 40 4* 3   AICE (2) Ceramics 1984 56 129 X 
CERCAL Footwear 1983 46,7 6* 5   AIDIMA  (3) Furniture 1984 35 111 X 
QUASCO Building 1985 44,1 11* 17 X AITEX  Textile 1985 35 99 X 
Centro Ceramico Ceramics 1976 na 31** 38   AIJU  Toys 1985 29 59 X 
CEMOTER 
Land-transporting 
Machinery 1982 na 13**     AIMME  Metal-Mechanics 1987 72 87 X 
              AINIA  Food 1987 43 163 X 
              AIDICO  Building 1990 10 99 X 
              AIMPLAS  Plastics 1990 10 71 X 
              ALICER  (***) Ceramics design 1993 na na X 
Horizontal Services Centres or IT 
ASTER Technological Development 1985 64 11** 30   IBV (4) Biomechanics 1986 38 137 X 
CERMET Metal-Mechanics 1985 32,2 8** 90 X ITENE  Packaging 1993 na 73 X 
DEMOCENTER Industrial Automatization 1991 29,2   26   ITI (4) ITC 1994 na 47 X 
              ITE (4) Energy 1994 na 62 X 
              AIDO (4) Optics 1986 16 73 X 
Financial Services             
FIT 
Financiation for 
Technological Development   75,3                   
In 1995 are no longer linked to ERVET: SVEX (export promotion), ASE (local development agency in Ravenna), PROMORESTAURO (promotion of historical and artistic heritage in Bologna), Rosalind (industrial promotion in Piacenza), IDROSER (water resources for 
development of the region), CETAS (training of experts in food and agriculture in developing countries), SPOT (Promotion and transfer of services to improve the metal-mechanic industry) and RESFOR (outsourcing of machinery)  
 
(*) In 1995 (**) In 1988   *** Merged AICE  (1) Established in 1971 as a firm cooperative, in 1978 became a research association (2) Spin-off from the Technical Chemistry Institute of Valencia University (3) On the basis of a technical unit of the Wood Employer’s Association; 
(4) In collaboration with the Polytechnic University of Valencia. n.a.: no available 
Source:  IMPIVA, Laboratorio di Politica Industriale, Nomisma, Bolonia. Quoted in Bellini (1990). ERVET (2002); Bellini & Pasquini (1998); Cooke & Morgan 1994); Bellini, Giordini & Pasquini (1990); Maccani,  (2007) and own preparation 
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In 1982 the Statute of Autonomy for the Valencian Region was approved. A 
year later, the first regional elections resulted in a majority for the Socialist Party of 
Valencia (PSPV-PSOE). The president of the new regional government, in his inaugural 
address, announced the creation of a regional institute for SME. A team of economists 
in the research bureau of the Valencia Chamber of Commerce had previously produced 
several, sectoral focused studies of the Valencian economy (Rico, 1982). They 
identified a lack of innovation in the regional industry, lack of technical staff, weakness 
of the advanced tertiary sector, and territorial concentration of several major low to 
medium-low technology manufacturing sectors. They identified the Valencian industry 
as at risk from competition with more technologically advanced firms in developed 
countries and companies in developing countries that could compete on lower 
production costs. 
The same team conducted analysis of industry policy in other European regions 
and countries, including Germany, the UK, the Nordic countries, the Basque Country 
and Italy, to highlight differences with the Valencian context. The situation in Valencia, 
thus, was not just a straight copying of the policy in place in Emilia-Romagna as some 
authors suggest (Cooke, 1996; Holmström, 2006). Nevertheless, Romano Prodi, a 
member of NOMISMA and founder of Rivista di Economia e Politica Industriale, in 
which he published several articles, had an intellectual influence. 
This research bureau team of economists proposed the creation of a regional 
agency for industrial policy, IMPIVA, to regional government, and helped to draft the 
Act that resulted in its establishment in 1984. The members of the team constituted 
IMPIVA’s first management directorate. The structural reasons behind the setting up of 
IMPIVA included the rapid technical evolution, the increased international competition 
on price, quality, diversity and design, and the competitive position of the Valencian 
economy between more advanced economies and low cost developing country firms. 
IMPIVA’s main objectives were to promote cooperation among companies, to increase 
the provision of advanced business services, to improve productivity, to facilitate the 
introduction of more advanced technologies and new product development in firms, and 
to foster the use of industrial design tools. 
The agency's initial budget was only 200 million pesetas (about €1.4 million), 
which was an incentive the agency to search for additional sources of funding, such as 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), in which the Valencian Region was 
part of Objective 1. European funds and Spanish government funds became a mainstay 
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of the agency’s budget which multiplied sixfold (up to 1,200 million pesetas or €14 
million). 
The agency, in collaboration with business associations in various sectors, was 
responsible for 14 TI in the mid-nineties.7 Most of these were new TI8, managed by 
professionals who were independent of the regional administration. The TI were 
registered as research and technology associations. This type of cooperation allowed the 
incorporation of additional companies in the TI and enabled them to have control in 
their management. 
Some of the aims of Valencia TI were similar to the objectives of the Italian 
RSC: to supply innovative technology services to regional SME to compensate for their 
scarcity and lack of variety in the region. However, there are also some important 
differences related mainly to their strategic governance. The first RSC built on a 
successful training activity, and centres began to be established without any analysis of 
the specific needs of district firms (Brusco & Pezzini, 1992; 2008). The network of RSC 
in Emilia Romagna was based on general requirements, which explains the breadth of 
the services they offered which contrasts starkly to their scarce resources.9 This implies 
that theorizing the ERVET model occurred a posteriori  rather than being the result of 
planning, as it might be deduced from the work of some scholars (Bellini, 1990; Bellini, 
Giordani & Pasquini, 1990; Bianchi & Gualtieri, 1990; Leonardi & Nanetti, 1990; 
Mazzonis, 1996; Capecchi, 1992; Cooke, 1996; Bellini & Pasquini, 1998).10  
On the other hand, the IMPIVA network of TI and their services were developed 
in line with a clear governance strategy and were managed by boards whose 
membership included firm representatives whose experience was gained through 
learning by doing. Operationalization of the IMPIVA network of TI was facilitated by 
dialogue with firms, close relationships with employers' associations and decentralized 
management. The process in each sector began with previous dialogue between 
IMPIVA and the presidents of sectoral employers’ associations. Once preliminary 
                                                 
7 IMPIVA was responsible of the setting up of four Business Innovation Centres (BICs) and a technology 
park. We focus on TI since they are more similar to the Italian RSC.   
8 The initial TI network consisted of one institute related to shoes (INESCOP) and a few technology 
support units related to wood and furniture (Tecmade) and ceramics and tiles (Ceramics Technical 
Institute, University of Valencia). 
9 Available data show that, in the 1980s, 11 ERVET centres employed a total of 105 workers, i.e., an 
average of 10 per centre, which makes it unlikely that they were able to offer an effective service in an 
extensive industrial area such as Emilia-Romagna. 
10 Belussi (2003: 246) suggests the impact of policies related to the provision of ‘real’ services has been 
exaggerated; he agrees with Brusco & Pezzini (2008) that intermediate institutions, such as service 
centres, have fulfilled a learning centre role for their members, but even in these cases the institutions 
were established without a clear agenda.  
 
 13
agreement was reached about the need for a particular sector, an association of 
innovative companies was established for each field, with the assistance of the 
IMPIVA. Although the management boards of these associations included two 
representatives of the agency, they were most led by representatives from the leading 
innovative companies in each sector. The associations and IMPIVA together elected the 
director of the sector TI, which helped to provide management continuity and 
accumulation of experience and absorption of corporate knowledge.  
The geographic agglomeration of firms in manufacturing clusters such as 
footwear, toys, ceramics, furniture and textiles resulted in the respective TI headquarters 
being located close to the cluster. Other TI provided business services to more 
distributed industries, such as metal-mechanical, plastic or food and beverages. A third 
group of TI responded to more general needs, through ‘horizontal’ centres such as 
optics and packaging. The Valencian universities provided a fourth type after the 
transformation of academic units of research, with a substantial industrial effect 
(biomechanics, computation and energy), into TI  
 IMPIVA network of TI is considered a policy success because of the broad 
range and quality of the services provided and the collaboration with and within firms. 
This success was confirmed by firms through various opinion polls conducted by 
IMPIVA on users’ satisfaction. The indicators provided in Mas et al. (1990) 
demonstrate the success of the early implementation of the IMPIVA network: in 1990, 
the existing eight institutes (average age 4.3 years) in the network had 1,353 affiliates, 
and had produced 7,675 laboratory analyses and 829 technical assessment services. The 
prestige of the TI has resulted in their representatives being used as expert advisers to 
the Spanish government. 
The success of the TI and IMPIVA is attributed to their modern management 
practices based on efficient administration and transparency. Important for the 
management of TI was the introduction of contracts and privacy agreements to increase 
trust in the relationships with industry. Policies related to the price of the services 
provided help to identify demand and adapt them accordingly. IMPIVA set specific 
goals for the TI, but favoured interaction rather than hierarchical management and 
relationship with TI. 
The economic relationship between IMPIVA and the TI initially depended on 
annual funding for the TI’s projects. IMPIVA evaluated the projects proposed based on 
objective criteria (e.g. number of associated companies, total volume of sales or human 
resources costs relative to total spend), to promote the most efficient use of staff. The 
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agency took account of changes that required improvements to or expansion of specific 
services. Regular meetings with TI presidents and representatives and their presence on 
the Advisory Board of IMPIVA, up to 1995, enabled good relationships and mutual 
understanding of the possibilities and constraints that applied to both parties. The 
relationships between companies and IMPIVA (and indirectly, also with the TI) were 
improved as a result of the implementation of regional programmes to support the 
development of technological innovation, the modernization of industrial equipment, 
and the promotion of design and fashion. For example, to encourage design efforts, a 
congress was held in 1985 which proposed scholarships for stays in main international 
academies and schools of design; IMPIVA also set up a design library and documentary 
unit at its headquarters, to improve relationships with and among designers; and several 
design units were set up in TI in line with IMPIVA’s decentralization strategy. This 
strategy is also evident in initiatives such as the setting up of independent technical 
units close to regional mini-clusters.    
5. Changes to innovation policy strategies and differential survival of public 
provision of innovation services in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. 
 
In the 1990s the innovation strategies in both the Spanish and Italian regions 
changed. In Emilia-Romagna, in the early 1990s and coinciding with the period of 
political change in regional institutions (1990), ERVET underwent thorough review and 
assessment of the public support it provided to firms and its supposed unfair 
competition for private firms belonging to sectors of technological and related services. 
This review was the result of lobbying by the employer’s associations attached to large 
firms (Rinaldi, 2005; Mazzonis, 1996), but also served the interests of other business 
associations. It was hoped that reducing ERVET’s influence would increase the spread 
of a ’free market’ and allow new services to be offered by associations of employers. 
This lobbying effort coincided with regional budget constraints and had consequences 
for some nodes in the RSC network, which either disappeared or was forced to accept 
the reduced public financial support.11  
The reorientation of RSC was a result also of the large number of centres that 
had been established and their original rather ambitious goals, which were out of kilter 
                                                 
11 Note that Brusco (1993) suggests that government intervention was limited to about 5 years and 
proposed the introduction of user fees to contribute to the self-financing of the RSC. There were also 
other reasons for the crisis in ERVET related to changes in the regional economy that occurred in the 
1980s and the emergence of new business hierarchies that replaced the traditional SME in relation to their 
size and marketing and management skills (Bellini & Pasquini 1998). 
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with the available resources (see Table 2). Among the 11 IMPIVA TI for which data are 
available, in the 1990s, the number of employed staff was 420 researchers, engineers 
and support staff (Ors, 1994) compared to around 103 people in the RSC between 1988 
and 1995 (Bellini & Pasquini, 1998). Some ten years later (circa 2005), the respective 
figures were 1,328 and 221 (Maccani, 2007), highlighting the different expansion and 
implementation of ERVET and IMPIVA networks. At the same time, industrial 
production in the Italian region in 2005 was double that in Valencia. Under these 
conditions, the scarce resources of the RSC could hardly develop an effective policy. 
This profound change calls into question the robustness attributed to Emilian 
institutional model (Cooke & Morgan, 1998). 
The reform of ERVET passed by government in 1993 led to a reduction in its 
responsibilities and resources. The RSC made efforts to adapt to the new framework 
and new competition rules and offer its services to medium-sized and large regional 
companies and to firms located in other Italian regions. However, some of the 
provisions of the new regional law were not fulfilled, such as the functions attributed to 
ERVET for the creation of scientific and technological nodes, technology transfer and 
economic profiting from research, functions that were assumed by ASTER (Agency for 
Technological Development of Emilia-Romagna), which had been created in 1985 and 
initially was part of ERVET. In 2003 there was a second reform that resulted in ERVET 
becoming a regional development agency responsible for (among other tasks) providing 
technical assistance to the region's infrastructure and attracting foreign investment, 
promoting cooperation with developing countries and developing collaborative 
activities with other European regions.  
In the early 1990s, Valencia suffered a major economic crisis. The victory of the 
conservative (Popular) party in the 1995 regional elections threatened the prevailing 
policy. Since the implementation in 1983 of the new innovation policy, the top regional 
representatives of the main Spanish employers’ association were opposed to IMPIVA, 
considering it interventionist, elitist and not focused on the problems being experienced 
by firms.12 They advocated for a more traditional industry policy incorporating grants, 
subsidies and low borrowing rates to encourage business investment, and other 
initiatives not linked to a specific innovation strategy. It could be argued that employers 
were trying to maintain a monopoly on the relationships between government and firms, 
                                                 
12 Some initial opponents subsequently admitted to misunderstanding the rationale for this regional 
government policy: the terms technological innovation, product differentiation, design, trademark, quality 
and internationalization were ‘too’ new for many firms. 
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which they saw as being threatened by firms having ties to regional government through 
TI.     
However, the TI were intended to be governed by ad-hoc associations of firms 
interested in new services to facilitate innovation activities, and IMPIVA funded part of 
the investment needed for these activities through a combined bottom-up/ top-down/ 
process. The model of governance in 1995 supported a wide ranging relationship 
between firms’ sectoral associations and the TI. Some of these associations were able to 
buffer the activities of the conservative government and the higher representatives of the 
employers’ association. It became clear that the network of TI would survive only with 
the support of the regional agency, otherwise it would sink because the employers’ 
sectoral associations were not sufficiently strong to sustain it. As result, the new 
regional government decided to reduce only partially economic support to the TI but 
making future funding uncertain and promoting self-financing.  
The bottom-up approach of the IMPIVA network of TI, which was a conscious 
strategy, enabled the network to resist some of the pressure to abandon the former 
innovation policy, resulting in a decoupling of industry policy from an ideological 
position that was likely to damage cooperation among IMPIVA, firms and the TI. This 
explains the lower levels of privatization and self-financing in Valencia than in Emilia-
Romagna. On the other hand, Emilia-Romagna developed a strong mechanical sector 
that requires high levels of technological expertise, which has encouraged the 
development of advanced services in private firms while the technology requirement for 
Valencia’s manufacturing sectors and specialization of advanced services, like those 
intensive in knowledge, is much lower, supporting continuity of the TI. 
Finally, we discuss the consequences of policy changes in Emilia-Romagna and 
Valencia and the effects of a shift towards more self-financing of the RSC and TI after 
the crisis in the mid-1990s. First, both organizations began to force closer relationships 
with large companies. This was not a retrograde step because it can lead to the 
acquisition of new expertise; however, it is counterproductive if it increases the 
likelihood of smaller firms being excluded due to the higher transaction costs involved 
in providing innovative and non-standardized services. Second, the TI service centres 
began to focus on low risk projects, a strategy that had three major consequences. First, 
an emphasis on projects funded by European programmes, which were low risk, 
provided the possibility of more certain finance in the long term, and opportunities for 
international relationships and contacts with new sources of knowledge. Second, it 
became more difficult to develop collaborative regional projects involving several 
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centres, which required long term commitment or investment in new infrastructure, 
because of the higher risks and higher implementation and transaction costs. Third, the 
scarce provision of new, specialised and risky new services because, also according to 
the new criterion, they have not demand enough to justify their implementation, 
confronted with well-known and standardized  services, more efficient from this point 
of view (Bellini 2002). 
In IMPIVA’s case, there was a loss of ‘freshness’ in the relationships among 
network nodes. Even moderation of regional-government positions after an initial 
hostile reception, did not prevent some loss of IMPIVA’s leadership. An indirect 
example is the creation by the TI of a lobby to defend their positions before IMPIVA 
and Spanish public administration. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper contrasted innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. Both 
regions have several similar economic and demographic features, including their 
industrialization processes, high proportion of SME, specialization in traditional 
manufacturing, concentration of firms in industrial districts and export activity.  
They both introduced innovative policy tools targeting SME, such as RSC 
(Emilia-Romagna) and TI (Valencia) in an attempt to overcome the barriers to 
providing advanced technological services to these firms. However, implementation and 
policy development followed different paths and were of different intensity due to the 
differences between the institutional and governance models of these regions and 
resulting greater strength of Valencia’s policy. 
In the 1990s, both regional governments revised their policies with the aim of 
reducing the public interventionism. The result was higher levels of privatization and 
self-financing in Emilia-Romagna than in Valencia. In the Italian region, the absence of 
an initial and persistent strategy, the presence of different employers’ associations with 
their own networks of firm services, the development of a private sector for advanced 
services, regional budget constraints, the small size of most RSC and the political 
changes since 1989 exerted strong pressure against regional policy. The result was an 
abrupt switch towards privatization of the services previously offered by ERVET and 
deep transformation of this agency. 
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In Valencia, the conscious choice of bottom-up governance supported a closer 
relationship between IMPIVA and firms’ sectoral associations and innovative SME, 
which favoured the survival of the TI even in the difficult economic and political 
conditions of mid 1990s. Also, features of IMPIVA’s original policies had an impact, 
for example, the holistic conception of its programmes, which allowed for synergies 
between TI and companies, and territorial decentralization of its innovation policies. 
There were also factors such as appropriate budget, small development of private firms 
in the field of knowledge services and the scale economies achieved by TI. All this 
aspects contributed to strengthening policy which helped SME and created a new and 
positive image of regional industry. However, the reduction in public funding had some 
negative consequences for the SME in both regions by encouraging lower risk service 
provision, priority being given to large companies’ needs, and extra-regional projects 
designed to ensure continuity of the TI and RSC.  
An industry innovation policy for SME, that is strong enough to survive the 
turmoil of political and economic changes needs an appropriate level of public 
governance that is not overly bureaucratic and is oriented to cognitive and territorial 
proximity to the policy recipients. This does not imply inertia or suggest that there is no 
need for evaluations and modifications to policy. Current problems are different from 
those in the 1980s and 1990s and policy must be adapted to reflect the new challenges. 
At the same time, policy takes time to achieve its objectives (Steinberg, 2012). We 
believe this comparative study of the Emilia-Romagna and Valencian cases provides 
some interesting lessons for scholars and policy makers keen to understand and achieve 
this subtle equilibrium between institutional continuity and adaptation to change. 
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